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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF

uT.AH,
Plaintiff a:nd Respo·ndent,
\S.

Case No. 6200

E. B. ERWL'. fuRRY FixcH and
R.. 0. PEARcE,
Defendants and Appellants.

Petition and Brief on Rehearing
of Appellant, E. B. Erwin
APPELL..lXT E. B. ERWIN''S BETITIOIN
FOR REHE·ARING.
(Original s·erved and filed.)
·Comes now E. B. Erwin, defendant and appellant
herein, and pursuant to law and the rules of this Court
respectfully requests and petitions this HonorabJe Court
to grant a rehearing of and to re-·examine the above entitled cause. In support of his petition and for his
grounds therefor, appellant respectfully alleges that this
H·onorable C·ourt erred in its ·opinion handed do.wn in this
cause in the particulars hereinafter set out. Accompany-
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ing this petition is a brief o·f authorities relied upon in
support hereof.

I.
. The Court erroneously rea!ched the conclusion:
(a)
(b)

That the corpus delecti had be-en proved.
That the corpus delecti could he proved by considering as evidence one inference bas·ed upon
. another inference.

II.
The Court erroneously held :
(a) That a conversation of a. certain witness was
admissiible in evidence to show a claimed admission of
appellant when it had not been shown and was not shown
that the eonver.sation testified to was heard by appellant.
(b) That appellant admitted guilt because he
failed to make a proper answer to a statement made by
the witne,ss Runzler that she had heard others say that
there was money bffing paid to prote-ct crim·e and that
appellant and others reeeived such money.

The C·ourt erroneously he~ld ad;missible under the res
gestae rule .c.ertain hearsay evidence which was based
upon other hearsay evidence, thus eonsidering as competent and proper evidence testimony of what'' A'' said
"'0'' said that "D '' said.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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IV.
The Court decided that the numerous errors found
in the record were not inc.onsequential and erroneously
decided ~that said errors did not prejudice appellant.

v.
The Court erroneously decided that errors admittedly prejudicial to appellant and repeatedly indulged in
were cured by the adm~nition of the Court, when as a
matter of fact the error committed was only magnified
and emphasized by such admonition,.
appellant prays this Honorable Court
to rehear and reconsider the above cause and. grant t~
appellant such relief as on the rooord ~e is so abundantly
entitled to. And appellant forever prays.
WHEREFORE,

BURTOX

W. MussER,

F. RICHARDS,
Attorneys for E. B. Erwin,
Appellatnt and Defendant .

EDWARD

.APPtE.LLANT E. B. ERWIN'S SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITION F.QR. R;EHEARIN·G
(Driginal s·erved and filed.)
Comes now appellant E. B. Erwin, and consent of
the Oonrt having been first obtained, files this his supSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plemental petition f.or rehearing, praying that the above
cause be re-examined, and without waiving any of the
grounds contained in his petition for rehearing, alleges:

A.
;That the Court erred in determining and finding that
the indictment herein was sufficient to inform appellant
of the nature and the caus-e of the accusation against him.

B.
That the Court erred in determining that the indictment was sufficient under the constitution and laws
of the ~State of Utah.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully prays that this
Honorable Court consider the a:hove in detennining
whether it will re-examine and rehear this ~cause.
BuRTON W. MussER,

F. RICHARDS,
Att-orneys for Appellant,
E. B. Erwin.

EDWARD

The record in this case is in many respects very unsatisfactory. It is long, complicated, contains many
ambiguities, and no doubt taxed the patienee of the writer
of the opinion. In many respe-cts the record is unusual.
The f.orm of the indictment, the nature of the alleged
proof, the character of the ~ritnesses, the disposition of
the defendants, and the obvi·ous determinations of the
trial judge-all ·Contributed to making a difficult task
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m{)re difficult and lead to mhnmderstandings conePrning
the facts and the applicable law.
This appeal is in no sense a. personal matter bet\\reen
counsel for appellants and the Court. ...-\.s officers of the
Court \\e urge with all of the persuasiYeness at our conlmand that the Court re-exanrine this cause and grant us
an opportunity to re-argue it t!() the C·ourt so that by
the process of meeting face to fa-ce and asking and answering questions, we can come more nearly doing justice
than has been done. In the follo-wing pages we give the
Court our best thought and attention to numerous parts
of the opinion we think demand attention. · However, we
hasten to admit that \\e haven't exhaustively treated the
seores of errors found in the opinion. There are upwards of thirty.
ARGUMENT.

I.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REACHED THE CONCLUSION:
(a)

THAT THE CORPUS DELECTI HAD BEEN PROVED,

(b' THAT THE CORPUS DELECTI WAS PROVEID BY CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE ONE INFERENCE BASED UPON
ANOTHER INFERENCE.
(a)

THE .CORPUS DELECTI WAS NEVER PROVED.

On page five of the opinion the Court says:
In order to support a verdict the state must pr-ove
the corpus dele<eti; that is, that a crime was comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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' mitted. In this case it must be .shoWn that- th~re
was such· an agreement as was >alleged in the in~
diotment between s-ome -of the defendants and that
.one .of the overt a·cts alleged has. been co'inmitted
.and this without the aid of the admissions of th~
defenrla;nts themselves. (Italics indicate emphasis
suppl~ed -by. the writer unless it otherwise appears.)
·
The opinion then reviews the evidence of certain
witness·es to show that appellant entered into the conspira~cy

·dharged and committed the overt acts alleged,

~nd

refers to the testimony of the witnesses H-olt (page
5), Record (page 6), and Kempner (page 6). After revi·eWing this· testimony the opinion says:
This ·evidence is sufficient to prove the corpus
dele·cti. While there is no direct testimony of any
express agreement on the part of defendants to
allow these illegal activlit~ies to operate, the only
.. , inference that can be drawn fro-m the fact these
operators paid the money to Holt and Stube;ck
under the circumstances detailed, that there was
an u·nd·erstanding that they would he allowed to
opera:te their illegal businesses.
The evidence the opinion ref·ers to is not sufffi.cient
to prove the eorpus delecti. Appellant is presumed to
be inri.·o·een:t of this charge until he is proved to be guilty
beyond a reas-onable doubt. That presumption is never
ov_erco1ne.; in this record. If the testimony above referred
t-o proves· anything, it only pr~oves that appellant was
Mayor; that upon his re-0omm·endation Mr. :minch was
uiianimously appointed Chief of P:olice by the entire City
Cominissio-n·; that houses of vice operated and that they
'

(,•,,

I

I

·-

-

•

•'

'

.

'
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had ~~!.a~~-)~n:g_ b~or~.{ an<l loug ~~.fter :.the. alleged
agreeme11t: that H.Wt demanded.·· that c.ertain. underworld
that the ,vitness Sn1ith·:·said he
.
_;....,:
.'
ll3d: heard somebody else say thaf tl~ere. \\yas a pay-off
in Salt-Lake City and that the M·ayor and the Chief of
Police ~ere participating in it : that ltecor~ s~id that
Pearce said that the Mayor had instructed him ('Record)
to make collections from gambling houses ; and- that
Kempner said that he went with Abe -Stubeck from one
licensed card room to another licensed card room. whare
~lle'ciions were made, and that St~be~k told Ke:mpner
that he t()ok the money over to Ben Harm{)n, who d_ivided
it up with Erwin and his crowd. The decisio·n th_en
..
tains the following paragraph which 1s not attributed
to any particular witness :

women pay him ·money;
·'.~~~

.

-~

~

.

'.

-~{.

-

,.

-

con-

About the middle of J anu_ary, ·1938, Harmon
telephoned Holt and asked him to_ pick him up,
which he did, and while driving around: Harmon
said, 'For God's sake (it-ali'es ·C{)uyt's), .don't
make any more collections ; Harris and Lee got
hold of Pierce and accused him of being in the
pay-off. Don't take anything from anyone any
·.more; as things might blow over.'
'
- ~ter revi_ewjng the :~hove evid~n~~ the. o:pi:~ti_o~
.t~ins this_ whoHy· unjustified state)Il~nt:. _. ~. :
~
~ ~::
·~·
•

•

•

•

4

--

•. ~

,,

_-, {' . .:

•

•

"

•

..

,.,

.:.

•

~

~his -evidence is sufficient to prove

delecti.

· ·
-

··

• :

-· · · · ··

.1.""•

I

J

:' .. .

.

~~-n
\.~

C':

.

t ••

:

the 0orpus
\/.. · ,.

''

·

What is the body .of the erime 1 It is .the ~greement.
~here is no evidence in. the rooord the Oourt .revie-wed,
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or elsewhere for that matter, that appellant ever entered into the agreement charged. The ·only part of the
evidence referred to that connects appellant Wlith any
phase of any offense is the testimony that Reeord said
that Pearce said that the Mayor said something ahout
·making a oollection; and the testimony that Holt said
that Smith said that Smith had heard that the Mayor
and the Chief had been in on a pay-off. No:vv that isn't
independent evidence to prove the fact that appellant
entered into the agreement. The only possrible probative
force it can have is to torture it into .being an admission
·on the part of ap·peHant that appellant had entered into
the agreement. It even isn't an admission. But the
opinion s·eems to construe it as being such. This evidence should not be considered by the c·ourt until the
corpus delecti had been proved. It cannot be considered
by the Court a.s being proof of the corpus deleoti. It is,
after all, only an admission. This testimony should be
entirely disregarded until the corpus delecti ·had been
proved.
(b)

THE CORPUS DELEIGTI CANNOT BE PROVEU BY CON·
SIDERI1NG A'S E~VLDENGE ONE INFERENCE· 'VHI'CH IS
BASED UPON ANOTHER INFERE·NCE.

The Court se·elned to have abandoned the idea that
the testin1ony referred to constituted adn1issions. The
opinion states :
While there is no ·drirect testimony of any express
agreement on the part of the defendants to allow
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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these iUegal aetiYities to operate, tht.' only i·nference that can be dra"yn from the fact that these
operators paid the mone~y to H-olt and Stubeck
under the circumstanees is that there "·as an understanding that they would be allowed to oper·ate
their illegal business.
The record is plain that these houses of Yiee operated
lt>ng before and long after the alleged conspiracy. From
the testimony that money was paid to Holt the Court
draws the i·nfe-re·nf:e. (1) that the -operators of the
houses of nee were allowed to operate. Now, upon that
inference the opinion draws the further inference, (2)
that houses of vice were allo-wed to operate by reason of
the agreement alleged. .A.s yet there is no proof of the
agreement, so the opinion infers one thing and from that
inference infers another thing, and after indulging in
the second inference concludes that an agreement had
been proved.
There is no proof in the record that when the m·oney
was paid to Holt he told the operators of the houses -of
vice that by reason of making the payments they could
.operate. There is no proof to show that the houses of
vice operated pursuant to any alleged agreement. But
af.ter going through all this, the opinion draws another
inference. It says:
The operators of gambling houses and houses of
prostitution do not pay police officers money for
nothing.
Upon that inference the opinion draws the further
inference that the operators would be protected in their

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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oJierations,- and- upon. that inference the opinion draws
the further -inference that the inferred proteetion came
about by 'reason :of the :conspiracy alleged.
The opinil.on further states:
The ewdence shows that about five_ hundred dollars was collected each month for a period of six
mo·nths at·>one time- and eight months the last
tim·e.
From this the opinion draws the inference that such
payments d'o not show a shakedown by an individual officer. .And. upon- that inference draws the further inference t4at there,must have been an understanding of
those higher up~-: And having drawn those two wholly
unwarranted inferences, the opinion 0oncludes that the
corpus dele~cti ha-d· been amply proved. The opini.on states
immed!iately following the foregoing re.citations:
..

'

'

Thus, the corpus delecti is amply proved.
As a matter of -fact, proof of the corpus dele·cti does
not f.ollow. It .cannot be said to follow without giving
full weight to inferences bas-ed upon other inferences,
and wi tho_ut asserting that the corpus delecti can be
prov~d ~olelr by the alleged admissions of the parties
eoncerned.
The inferences drawn by the court we respectfully
edntend are not justified by the facts upon which they

·are
hase-d. ·The 1aw "l.s well settled that one conclusion
,:
.,•

.

'

.

'-

or inference cannot be based upon another co1iclusion or
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~~r~n~e:

State r . , Pqte-llo. 40 lTtah, 56, 119 -~ac~ ,-10~3.

In this case the defendant
stolen a. horse.

\\~as

charged 'vith having

There ·was evidence to sho\v that the

defendant had possession of the_ horse,. but_. there was

no evidence to sho"'""

"~hether

the horse had wandered

from the range or been driven the~eir~m. _ In speaking
upon the question of presumptions and inferences the
court stated :
It is a familiar r-ule that one presumption or inference ca-nnot rest upon OJrWther mere inference
or preswmpti&n. It can only rest on proven facts.
In accordance with that rnie, the inference or
presumption referred to in. the. statute is also
based, not on mere il}ference, .but on declared or
proven facts. Let it be assumed that the evidence
sufficiently shows that the defendant's. expl~na
tion of his possession w.as not satisfactory. Do
the proved facls on the part of_ the state also
prove the larceny? We think ·not. • * * All
it showed was that the horse got out, strayed
away, and four or five months' thereafter was
found in the po-ssession -of t:}l~ acoo.sed, whp said
he bought him from an IndiaA:, an(! who; r~fu.sed
to give him up. Of eourse, the_) state seeks to draw
the inference that- the hoTse ·-strayed to the range
sQme s~_ or eight- miles from the -~-defend~nt's
. place, and that some ·One there took and d~·OV€ him
-away; and, since the h-oTse was found -in the :de-f~ndant's _poss~ssion, the. f:grth~er infe_re~·ce is
sought thaf the defendant took-'and drove, or aided
-another to- take and drive; the horse · from ·the
range. B1rbt this is merely res~ting an infere'nce or
a presumption upon am i'nfereni:e or a. preswmp-

: ·tion. ·
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· · In the instant. ease the state proved that the opera'

tors

:

-

-

.

of houses ·of vice

paid money to H·olt. . No further

facts were proved in ·either ease, and in both cases the
c~urt
'

.

had endeavored to base the remaining elements ·of

the- crime by drawing inferences from. the one fact
proved. From that fact the opinion starts into motion
a ·series of inferences which result in an unwarranted
ipse dixit of the write-r of the opinion. The opinion cannot arrive at the ·conclusion it did arrive at without
wholly relying on inferences.
The question of inferenees is again fully discussed
by this court in the case .of Bt'ate v. Judd, 74 Utah 398,
2'79 P-a:c. 95,3. See also Utah Foundry and M~achine C·ompany v. Utah Gas and Coke, 4;2 Utah 5~33, 133 P·ac. 1173;
Busse v. Murray Meat and Livestock Company, 45 Utah
596, 147 Pac. 62'6; K~a,rren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 Pa:c.
1049, 95 A. L. R. 1'6'2.
In New York Life Insurance Company v. McNeely,
(Ariz.) 79 P1a!c. ('2d) 948, the .Supreme Court of Arizona
discusses this principle as applicable to a ·civil case. It
also considers the s~tatement of D·ean Wign1ore on this
rule. The Arizona ease has a third of a column filled
with authoritie-s from many, if not all, jurisdictions in the
United States, holding that ''one inference cannot rest
upon another inference.'' At pa.ge 904 of the above
report the Court says :
The eour:ts, however, have always insisted that the
life, liberty and property of a citizen should not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be taken away on possibilities, eonjectures, or
even, generally speaking, on bare probability.

Again:
This rule is not based on an ap·plica.tion of the
exact. rules of l-ogic, but upon the pragmatic principle that a certain quantum of proof is arbitrarily required when the courts are asked to take
away life, liberty, or property.
So the evidence here complained of is not admissible
and is not eompetent~ To hold otherwise you must ove·rrule State v. Potello; State v. Judd; Utah Foundry a;nd
Machine Company v. Utah Gas and Coke; Busse v. Murray Jfeat omd Li·restock Company; am,d Karren v. Blair,
supra. In his third edition on evidence, paragraph 41,
Wigmore refers to the MeX eely case, supra, and· approves the rule laid down by that court.
The old rille in- 1 Wigmore on E·vidence, paragraph
41, is based on a perfectly silly argument. For instance
the author says:
For example, on a charge of murder, the defendant's gun is found discharged; from this· we infer
that he discharged it; and from this we infer
that it was his bullet which struck and killed the
deceased.

Again:
Or, the defendant is shown to have been sharpening the knife; from this we have the design that
he intended to use it; and from this we argue that
the fatal stab was the result of this design.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The above statements are merely the unfounded and
unsupported statements of the author. If they are true
then everyone owning a gun and everyone found sharpening a knife is liable to be convicted where a shot is fi-red
or a person is stabbed.
II.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HE.LD:

(a)

T'HAT A CONVERSA-

TION OF A CERTAIN WTTN.ESIS WAS ADMISSIBLE. IN
EV:UDE:NICE TO SHOW A CLAIME-D ADMISSION OF APPELLANT WHIDN IT HAD NOT BEEN SHOWN AND WAS
NOT SHOWN THAT T'HE CONVERSATION TESTIFIED TO
WAS H.:IDAR'D BY APPE'LLANT.

(b)

THAT

APPELLANT

ADMITTEID GU:ULT B:IDCAUSE HE FA!lLEill TO MAKE A
PROPER

AN!S'WER TO

A

BTATEiMENT MADE BY THE

W'I'TNESS RUNZLER THAT SHE

H~AD

HEARD OTHERS SAY

THAT THFJRE, WIAS MONE:Y BEINO PAID TO PROTECT
.

~

CRIME A:NU THAT AP·PELL.A!NT AND OTHERS RE:CElVED
SU!CH MONE,Y.

(a) The silence of appellant at the conversation ·
testified to by the witness Harris was not an admission
and should not have been received by the court on the
theory that it oonstituted an admission on the part of
the appellant.
Mr. Harris testified that on a certain date a group
of men were invited to a luncheon at the Alta Club. That
amongst those persons were certain newspaper men, Mr.
Finch and Mr. Erwin. That after the luncheon had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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coneluded, Mr. Harris entered the room and
in certain oonYersations.

parti(~ipated

The record shtnYs that the

table around whieh they sat 'vas about as large as one
of counc.il tables in the courtroom and that Mr. Er,vin

sat a.t one end of the table a.nd Mr. Finch, the host, at the
other end thereof and that Mr. Harris sat by Mr. Fish.
It -was at this conversation that Mr. Harris made
certain

statements~

w.hich for the la·ck of a proper an-

swer the opinion holds constituted an admission on the
part of appellant.
On cross examination the -witness was asked if as

a matter of fact he didn't write the figures that were
involved on a piece of paper and then shDw it to Mr. Fish,
and the witness frankly stated that he might have done
that.

There is no endence in the record that appellant
heard the alleged a~usation. Mr. Finch denied that he
heard it.
With respect., to this alleged admission, the opinion
states:
The circumstances des·cribed would make it almost imp-ossible for them not "to hear what was
said. It is true that on cross examination Harrjs
said that he probably wrote the figures 750 and
500 on a piece -of paper and showed. them to Mr.
Fish sitting next to him, but -this does. not contradict his original testimony, nor m_ 0/Y!Y · way
mdicate that the defenda;nt' might not have heard
the iliccusatwn.
·
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..,The purpose Gf the testimony was to show that ·be-.
c.ause appellant didn't vo0iferously deny what Mr. Harris said he thereby ir~pliedly a·drnitted the truth of what
Mr~ iHarris said. ·.· But this s-ort of evidence is not' admis·sible on the the.ory · that it constitutes an admission
until it clearly appears that appellant did hear it. It
is . a signifi.c~nt thing that the· happening occurred at a
socia~ engagement; that appellant was further away from
the speaker than any -other person in the room; that the
witness said· that he might have shown the figures to
Mr. Fish.· If you give appellant the benefit of his presumption of innocence, why not conclude that he did
not hear it. Why assume that he beard it.
After all, it is claimed that a certain a·ccusation was
made in the presence of appellant; that he did not deny
it; that he thereby admitted the truthfulness of it; and
that thereby he admit~ted .that he had entered into a conspiracy as alleged in the indictment. Whereas, not knowing that app·ellant did hear the conversation and knowing
that Mr. Finch testified that he did not hear the convers~ition (.&lthough Mr. Finch sat much closer to the
speaker than did appellant) why conclude tha~t appellant
heard the eonversation and :then set in 1notion a chain
of il}fierenees v\rith which to destroy appellant.
In Bloomer ·v. Sta,te, 75 Arkansas 297, the lower
court was held to have committed error by admitting in
evidence a s'ta temen t of a "ri tness made in the presence
of the defendant who at the time was staggering around
the room intoxicated. This· was error he-cause the SuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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p~eme

Court held ·it 'vas not sho'vn that the defendant
heard the· remarks.
-__ Because of.appellant 's asserted silence "·it.h respe,ct
tothe statement it is not show·n tha-t he heard, the· opin-

ion attributes the truth of such a statement to appellant.
Why not assum-e that appellant did not hear it because
if. he did hear it he would ha Ye said something about it.
There is no testimony thai appellant looked abashed,
hung his head, or ''flushed'' or that he stammered, or

anything else. The testim-ony is that after the luncheon
party broke up all walked out of- the room together as
if nothing had occurred.

(b) Appellant did not admit his guilt because he
failed to make a proper answer to the statement made
by the witnes·s Runzler.
On page 15 of the opinion, it is -stated:
The conversation testified to by Mrs~: Runzler,
with Mr. E~ comes squarely within this rule.
When the accusation was made he flushed considera;bly, and said: 'Oh, I am·aooused· of that t'oo,·
am I?';.and immediately. changed the- subj.ect. It
is a well-recognized fact that when a person holding the position which· Mr. Erwin held at that
- time, as Mayor of a large city, is accused by one
of his constituents, as testified by Mrs. Runz~er,
and he 'is not guilty of that. accusation, he will
usually be very positive in his denials of guilt.
Instead of that, here he passed the m·atter off
.very lightly and made no denial of the accusation.
'This evidence was therefore clearly · admissible.
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Mrs. R111nzler made no mccusation.

Mrs. VooCott,

the other person in the room, made no accusalion.. The
trut·h is that Mrs. Runzler testified that at the time of
~he

conference Mrs. VanC'ott said that she (Mrs. Va.n-

Cotrt) had heard it rumored that there was a pay-off and
that the mayor and the chief of police and others were
taking part of the money.
Was it the appell·ant's duty to deny that Mrs. Van:C'ott had heard the

rumor~

I had heard it and I have

heard it with respect to every mayor we have ever had
and the rumors are all false. The mayor eouldn 't say to
her: ''That is a lie,-you didn't hear it.''

And if he

didn't say that it doesn't constitute an admission that
houses of vice were being operated because they· were
paying money to the polic.e offi·cer for protection because
of a conspiracy entered into by app:ellant.
The above sta;tement in the opinion is not fair. It
isn't fair tO. appellant, nor to the writer of the opinion,
nor to ·counsel, nor to· .court. It just isn't erickett.
. Appellant was not accused of any erime. What if
Mrs. VanCott said what she is alleged to have said,said it as if she herself did not believe it. What if she
said it smilingly, lightly, or tripp~ingly ~ Must her hea-rer~
fail to "flush'', refuse to .smoke, and not change the subjecf~ I am sure that if the same s'tatement were ·made
by the same· person to each member of this court separately that each member would react differently.
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'Yhy abandon the presumption of innocence to e.onelude that because appellant did not make the ans\Yer
that the writer of the opinion thought he should make,
he thereby admitted that he was receiYing a. pay-off of
$750, "·hieh proved that houses of Yice operated pursuant
to an agreement to permit them to operate·?

The opini<>n takes judieial notice of how a. pers·on
might react and should react under certain -circumstances. The '\\Titer of the opinion is not justified in
reaching the cone.lusion that from what occurred at the
time of the conference -of Runzler and VanCott with appellant, there emerged an admission that appellant had
entered int<> an agreement to permit houses of vice to
operate in Salt Lake City. \\ e cited numerous cases
in our original briefs utterly destroying this sort of
evidence.

III.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD ADMISSIBLE U·NDIDR THE
RES

GESTAE

R'CLE

CERTAIN

HEARSAY

EVIDEN"'CE

WHICH WAS BASED UPON OTHER HEARSAY EVIDENCE,
THUS CONSIDERING AS COMPETENT AND PROPER EVI-

DENCE TESTIMONY OF WHAT "A" SAID "C" SAID THAT
"D'' SAID.

T.he opinion gives full weight to evidence that is
clearly hearsay. The testimony .of witnesses Record, Holt,
and Kempner are fair examples as to the length to which
the opinion has gone in respect to this matter. We will
not iterate all of the many statments in the opinion
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which are based on hearsay evidence, but will call attention to a few of them.
· The witness Re-cord:
Mr. Rec:ord testified that P·earce told him that he,
Bearce, was responsible for Re0ord 's being placed at
the head of the vice squad; ''that the Mayor had instruCJted him ( P·earce) to make -colle-ctions from gambling
houses and other forms of vi'ce; * * *" (Opinion,
page 6). Record further testified that he was in Mr.
Pearce '·s office and Mr. Pearce said, "that the Mayor
had requested him, .Pearce, to ·make colle'ctions '' (tOpinion, page 9).
The opinion states that ,., the testimony of Record
·Clearly indicates that there was an understanding between Pearce and his associates to .allow the violation
of la.w for money." Who ' 'his associates" refers to is
:not dis·closed. ''To allow the violation -of law for money"
is not explained.
1

The opinion states:
Harmon said to him that Pearce had aucused him,
Hoi t, of holding out.
Again,
T.he testimony by Holt that Harmon said that
Harris had a'ccused P~earce of being in the pay-off
* * * (:Opinion, page 18).
We are not complaining as to what Pearce said to
Record orwhat Harmon said to Holt, but we do object to
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ha.ving. Reoord testify as to _"~hat Pea reP told ·him the
Mayor said. and "~e object to Holt testifying· as to w·hat

Harm.on told hin1 Pearce said,. and 'Ye

obje~~t

to . Holt

testifying_ as to what Harmon said Harris accused P.earce
of. To the writer of the opinion all of the foregoing
evidence was admissible to show that Harmon "~as connected with the conspiraey. ~·and therefore this testimony
was admissible.''
The court then discusses what Kempner said Stubeck told him, (page 19). Kempner testified that Stubeck said to him:
All the card games have to pay, but some of them
try to welsh on it. - I take the money to Harmon,
who divides it with Erwin and his crowd.
The opinion states th-at under the ordinary ru1es
those statements of Kempner were not admissible. They
were, however, admitted. They are very prejudicial.
The opinion thereupon cites cerrtain cases which the
writer claims support the doctrine that such evidence
is admissible because the statements are a part of the
res gestae {page 19). H-owever the opinion is not satisfied with those authorities. On the same page of the
opinion the writer .gives his reasons why such statements
were not Oxlmissible but hastens to explain that they were
admissible in the discretion of the trial court, and then
states:
In this ·ease the Court did not violate its discretion in receiving this evidence.
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The:ca.s.~s

referred t.a ·in,. the opi;n,ion do .nQt lyol.d that
such er,videnoe is. _admissible.
I

'

In State v. Haynes, ('Oregon) 253 Pac.. 7, the qties~
t~on before the c~ourt wa.s the admissibility in evidence
'6r a bucket of .nuish. arid a. barr~l still, and not a. herarsay
s'tatement. In Delaney ·v. United Stlates, 283 U. S. 586,
'6-8 L. Ed. 462; 44 Sup. Ct. 206, the. Court said that a- conspirator could testify as to what· a eo..,conspirator stated
with respe-ct to the conspiracy, but that case did not. hold
that a person who is not a conspirator, Kempner, eould
testify that Stuhe,ck told him, Kempner, that he, Stubeek, eollere~~ted mioney from the .card games and took it
over. to Harmon,,and Harmon divided it wit~h Erwin and
his crowd. You will not find any case anywhere decided
by any eourt tha.t. that ,sort of testimony is admissible.
~f this opinion is finally adopted this will be the only
opinion in existence that uphoids such a strange doctrine. The- writer of the opinion ·constantly confuses
the 1a,nguage of witnesses and the language of the deCISions. The cases do no·t hold that ''A'' may testify
that '·''B '' told ''A~~· that '' 0'' told ''B.'' something. That
is ex.a:ctly what this .opinion hol~s.
1

: In .Boo-th v~ Nelson, 61 Bta]l 239, 21.1 Pac. 985, this
C:ou:ft. ·held that in order Jo .cume within the res gestae
r11le.~ the· :staJytemen( had to be $:po~t·aneous., institnctive,
and ;connected with. 'the ma.in or pri1wip·a.l :event or trahbS'acti_on and result. from the imm,;ediarte and .present.~itn

fluenae$:rof the main ev·ent and \be cont.emporafne·oUs·with
it. If the Co-qr:t :w:ants to overrule the .· N els·on 0ase it
I

'

•
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should d-o so ·with greater regard to· the seriousness of
suc.h a step than is eYinred in the opinion under consideration.

An. oral

admission of a party can be ·shown only
by the testimony of a person who heard it; ·a Wit~
ness who did not hear the admission cannot testify as to what a person "~ho did hear it told him
about it. (22 Corpus Juris 206.)

Justice \\ olfe agrees "~ith us that it "~as error to
admit the above referred to Kempner testimony, but
unfortunately con:cludes that alth.ough it was error it
was not prejudicial error.
If you take out of the record-

"~hat

the witness
Record .said Pearce said the mayor said; and if you
take out of the record what Record said that Pearce said
that the mayor reques~ed Pearce to do; and then if you
eliminate from the record ·what Holt said ·Harmon said
Pearoo said and what Holt said Harmon said that Finch
said, and then eliminate from the record what Kempner
said Stubeck said Harmon said, then the only proof you
have of the corpus delecli so far as this appellant is
concerned are the so-called admissions.
· The conduct of appellant at the instance testified
to by: Mrs. Runzler is not an admission. What the opinion states Fisher Harris said is not shown to have been
hea:.rd by appellant and n.othing in the record that Hunsaker testified to constitutes an admission that -'establishes the guilt .of appellant. If they are admissions
they tCan not be used to ·prove· the corpus deleeti.'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

If the court eared to, it could write a much stronger,
a much more logical, and a much more per,suasive opinion reversing tthe ·Case as to appellant than it has w·ritten
affirming the case.

If the court is looking for matters

tha.t prejudice appellant and matters that support the
presumption of innocence they are easily found because
the record is full of them.

IV.
THE CO.U.RT DE:CTDIDD THAT THEi NUMEROUS ERRORS FOUNID

IN T·H·E REICORD WERE NOT INCONSE,QUENTIAL AND
ERRONffiOUSiLY DEICIDE[) THAT SAID EIRRORS DID NOT
PREiJU:DI'CE .AJPPEiLLANT.

The errors referred to were prejudicial.
In State v. Jensen, 75 Utah 299, 279 Pac. 506, this
Court held that it would he presumed that error of the
kind under discussion was prejudicial. It .stated:
We also are of the opinion that the admission of
such objectionable testimony was. prejudicial. The
natural tendency of it wa.s to do harm. From such
kind of error prejudice will be presun1ed, until
by the record it is affirmatively sho"\\rn the error
was not or could not have been of harmful effect.
Jensen v. Utah R. Co., (Utah) 270 Pac. 349. From
the record it cannot be told that the objectionable
testin1ony did not influence the jury in the rendition of the verdict. * * *
See also the case of Parlton v. United States, 75
F-ed. ( 2d) 772, which held as follows :
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Xor can it be properly contendPd. as "·as sngg~sted in the original brief of the goYerninent,
that the error 'Yas harnlless. The g·enerally
applied rule is that when errn·r a ppt"\a i·.s in th.e
record it is pres1uned to be injurious unless it
appears beyond any doubt that it did not and
could not prejudice the rights of the parties. * *
* (Italies ours).
The record is saturated "ith error. Error was
repeatedly committed. It was purposely committed.
Error was committed without any regard to the rights
of the defendants. Errors were shamefully committed
and continuQusly committed. In referring to the opening
statement of the District Attorney the opinion states:
It covers 73 pages of the transcript and in it the
District ..Attorney attempted to recite verba:tim
practically all of the many conversations which be
intended to pro-ve. A number of these conversations u:ere obt·iously hearsay, and were not admitted in evidence. In several of these instances
the court instructed the jury to disregard the
District Attorney's statement of them. In other
cDn\ersations the recital in the opening statement
was more fav.orable to the state than when later
testified to by the witnesses. There were many
objections interposed, and the oourt repeatedly
admonished the jury that the statements of the
District Attorney should not be considered by
them as evidence, and a number of times asked
the District Attorney to make his statements more
general and to omit hearsay evidence. F1or a
short time after these admonitions the District
Attorney followed them, but soon drop·ped back
into his old habit.
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,<~.un :_Sq; reg~rdles-s, of.-.the· instru~tlon$ of '.th~:! C<n1x:t, the

State!:s; A.tto·rn~.y was·~<lete;ITn.lined to bias .and prej~dice
the jury·.and to·win:the verdict at,alLcos.ts..... :, 1·-·
1

'

' t't ::ca~not be ,said that such coriduc't did not influence
the jury prejudtc1n,ny. Again the· opinion states:
I

The ·Di$trict .·Attorney went way beyond ··what
'Yas proper.
.. . : 'The· error is cumulated. It is much more grave
in'· this case than- it was in the Vasquez case recently
decided by this C;ourt.

v.
THE. COURT

IDRRONEOUSL.Y

DIDCI'DEJD THAT

ERRORS ID

:ADMITTEIDLY ,'PREJUDIC'ItAL TO APPELLANT' AND RE, PEATEDLY

INtDU.LGElD

lN

WEREi

CURED

BY

THE

ADMONfTION OF T·HE COURT, WHEN AS A MATTER OF
·~AOT.

THE · EIRROR COMMIT·TED WA:S ONtL:Y MAGNIFIED

AND IDMPHA:S'IZE[) BY SU:CH .A!DMONITION.

. .· · ,The ·n~mer~us errors ·committed in the intr~duction
of. evidence coupled with the persistent imprope.r ~state
ments made by State's C'ounsel to the jur.y constitute
r~\r.etsible ··error. This er_t6t is Jiot cuted even· though
.
the :trial -:court doe.s ~sustain objections· t-o it,. and even
tli~:nigh the· trl.al.court undertakes to is trike such evidence
and ·sue~ improper ';statements f:r.orn the re~o-rd. An
occasional inadvertent error !or:f the prosecuto~ may be
eured by the trial court hy admonishing the jury not
·consider it, and. an 'Oecasional improper question may
'

.

':

'

'

.

~

'

'

.

I

to
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also be thus cured·. But ;where the objectionable· questions are repeatedly asked and repeatedly ruled on, and
where the objeetionable statements are repeatedly 1nade
and repeatedly ruled on, the error thus co~tted is not
and cannot be cured by the usual .admoniti~n of the
Court.

This Court in Sta.fe v. Alartinez, 56 Utah 351, 19~1
Pac. 214, ·Se\erely criticized the prosecuting attorney
and reversed the e.ase for an error much less grave than
the admitted errors committed in this case. With withering language it denounces the persistent misconduct of
State's Counsel. It calls attention to the fact that the
District Attorney stands before the jury representing
the majesty of the law; that he has the implicit confidence
of the jury, which usually is well deserved; and that
under such circumstances when the prosecutor makes
statements of the kind under discussion it is bound to
prejudice the defendant. The language of this Court
in that case on this subject is as follows :
The district attorney stood before the jury representing the majesty of the law, and no doubt
had the implicit confidence of the jury, which was
well deserved~ The case at best W<JS exceedingly
close, and~ the evidence complicat!3d and i/!ifficul:t
to digest. In these circumstances the defendant
was aJ a decided disadvo;ntage. ·-When the district
attorney .said that the defendant had admitted- the
·shooting, and. r~iterated . the statement ip th~
presence of the_ jury, they must have thought that
· ' · by some .·implication of law ·an·. admission by
·. ·. defendant had actually been made.. In view of
. the circumstances, .. we think the statemen1 was
·
prejudicial error: (Italics ours).
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It wa~s the duty of State's Counsel t1o act impartially
and in the interest only of justice. He should not become
a heated partisan. It i~sn 't his duty to seek to procure
a conviction at all hazards. When he does that he ceases
to properly represent the public interest. The State
demands no conviction. It should seek no conviction
through the aid of pas~sion, sympathy, or resentment.

Vickers v. United States, 1 Okla. Cr. 452, 98 Pac. 467:
A public prosecutor is presumed to a:ct impartially in the interest only of justice. If he lays
aside the impartiality that ,should -characterize
his official action, to become a heated partisan,
and by vituperation rof the prisoner, and appeals
to prejudice, .seeks to procure a conviction at all
hazard·s, he ceases to properly represent the public interest, which demands no victim, and seeks
no conviction through the aid .of passion, ~sym
pathy, or resentment. The only way to seeure
fair trials is to set. aside the verdic.t so procured.
In a civil suit where damages for personal injuries
are sought, almost the mere mention of the fact that
defendant is insured by an insurance company constitutes reversible error, and all that-- is at .stake is a few
dollars.

But here, life and liberty are at stake,-rep-

utations, money, ·everything is at stake. If it is prejudicial error in a civil action to prejudice a jury against
defendant by improper .conduct of 0ounsel for the plaintiff, ·certainly in a criminal ~aetion like .conduct on the
part .of the State's counsel i·s prejudicial error. In 56
A. L. R., page 1492, there is an annotation on this
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subject a.s it affects eiYil suits. The annotation is brought
down to a very much later date. The annotator's language in this annotation is so apt that w·e take the liberty
of quoting part of it :
llany eourts have taken the position that the prejudicial effect of an attempt to inject iinproperly
into the trial of a negligence case, ·by evidence,
statements. or arguments, 1natters fflom "~hich the
jury might infer that the defendant was insured
against liability, cannot be cured by its exclusion
and by instruction to the jury to disregard it.
Their position is that evidence that the defendant
in an action for negligence is insured in a casualty
company, or that the defense is being conducted
by such company, is n{)t only inc-ompetent, but so
danger-ous and prejudicial as to require a rev-ersal
e z_·e n when the court strikes it from the record
and directs the jury to disregard it. * * * The
theory is that the very fact that objections are
interposed to such questions may be, and probably is, more prejudicial to the defendant than
-otherwise, for by {)bjection the matter is particularly called to the attenti1on of the jury; and, on
the other hand, a party should not be deprived
of his prinlege to urge a valid objection because
a greater prejudice might follow; he should not
be ·subjected to a possible penalty for insisting
upon a proper regard for his right, but rather
the penalty, if penalty there be, should be visited
upon the real party in fault, even in the absence
of an affirmative answer.

State's counsel should not be permitted to resort to
the practice of violating the law of evidence, trusting
that the error will be cured by the usual impotent instruction to the jury to disregard it. In this case the statements of State'·s counsel were unwarranted and illegitiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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niate and·to~·disregard them would not only make atrial
a useless sham, but it would convert it into a judicial
farce. The ·error, of improperly getting· to the jury by
s-tatement, arguments, or testimony is prejudiciaL ~It is
p·~esumed to ~e· prejudicial. One can hardly say that
s;bite;1s attorney was not persi,stent and did not intend
to win at all co-sts. This court points out that several
time~ the trial court instructed the jury to disregard
the District Attorney's statement and .asked the District
Attor~ey to make "his ~statements more general and to
~omit hearsay. The opinion states:
The District Attorney f.ollowed them, but soon
dropp·ed back into his old habit of placing before
the jury imp11oper statements.
·

With the consent of the Court, appellant has filed a
supplemental petition for a rehearing, alleging that the
Court erred in finding the indictment sufficient. This is
the first intimation we have had that without being supported by a Bill' of' Particular's the indictment was suffi·cieilt.' The opinion states on the bottom o.f page 2 that
the question ~of whether 'Or not an· indictment can be cured
by a Bill of P·articulars is not before the. Court because
"tbi~s indictment is ·.sufficient without the Bill of Particulars.'' · An informatri·on -containing the meagre allegations that this· indictment co~ tained was held to be insufficient in State v. Lund, 75 Utah 559, 286 Pac. 960. And
this indictment is ·not sufficient if tested by the other
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cases cit~_ in appellant's brief commeneing at
of.page 14.

t4e.b~t~

The indictment has been skeletinized in appellant's
original brief. The particulars in 'Yhich the indicbnent
is insufficient are set out in the brief and are so obvious
that a further discussion of them would not be profitable.
1 do not think the writer of the opinion can fairly say
that those particulars are not sufficiently pointed out.
(Opinion, page 2) It \\as because the indictment was
insuffieient that the Court required the state to particularize. (Appellant's brief, page 13.-Laws of Utah, 1935,
Section 105-21-9). See State of Utah vs. Sid K. Spencer,
opinion on Petition for rehearing N.o. 6223.
CONCLUSION.
There are upwards of thirty distinct instances in
the opinion where either misstatements of the evidence
or of the applicable la" iOceur, or where the evidence
is so obviously misinterpreted and given effect as interpreted, as to be entirely misleading. We have not sought
to set out each of these instances, but in the brief of
appellants Finch and Pearce and in this brief they will
sufliciently appear to demonstrate the necessity, or if
not the absolute necessity the very great desirability,
of granting a rehearing in this cause. We believe that
we can clearly demonstrate to the Court on re-argument
where we can meet the judges face to face that many
grave injustices will be done if this opinion is allowed
to stand in its present form. We als-o are firmly of the
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belief that we can convince the c~ourt that by the decisions
of this Court and the law of this State appellants are
entitled to a reversal. Because of the seriousness of
the charges and the way it inevitably affects appellants,
we very earnestly request that we be given an opportunity to again argue this matter to this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
BuRTON W. MussER,
EDWARD

F.

RICHARDS,

Attorneys for Appellant,

E. B. Erwin.
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